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EDP’s Tender for EDP Renováveis 
Buying low after selling high? 
 
It was March 27, 2017, a typical day in Lisbon with the same routine, the same people, the usual 
traffic and a quite pleasant sunny day, when Mr. Nuno Pimentel arrived at his office at Av. da 
Liberdade and came across a subject of extreme importance. Mr. Pimentel, a portfolio manager 
at XYZ Asset Management, read the previous evening's announcement by Portugal's large 
electrical utility, Energias de Portugal (EDP), of its tender to acquire all outstanding shares of the 
company’s publicly traded subsidiary EDP Renováveis (EDPR) at €6.801 per share. Based upon 
last day's closing price, a premium of 9.7% would be obtained. 
Mr. Pimentel was unprepared for such surprising and unexpected news, and therefore, he 
approached his office balcony right at the centre of Lisbon and starred the magnificent sunny view 
of the Tagus river and started to assess the offer and whether he should accept it or not.  
The key decision factors Mr. Pimentel weighed in his thoughts were if the amount per share 
offered by EDP was a fair price and the possible consequences of his decision. Thus, he came 
back to his office and after gathering all the relevant information and considering all the available 
options (Exhibit 1), he performed his own valuation.  
Nevertheless, on April 21, 2017, Mr. Pimentel’s noticed that Massachusetts Financial Services 
(MFS) Investment Management’s portfolio managers sent an open letter to EDP’s Executive 
Board of Directors presenting their reasons why they would not be selling their shares at the 
Tender. Indeed, MFS’ portfolio managers, entirely disagreed from EDP’s valuation methodology 
and resulting offered price and announced their opposition to the proposed Tender. Consequently, 
as MFS considered that EDP would be paying an unfair value for EDPR’s shares, a “valuation 
battle” started between the two most important shareholders of EDPR.  
While EDP controlled 74.5% of EDPR’s shares when the offer was announced, MFS and its 
Investment Management subsidiaries controlled 4.07% of the total shares outstanding and 4.04% 
of the total voting rights. MFS represented the most important threat for EDP to pursue with its 
offer as MFS was the most relevant minority shareholder of EDPR. Under Spanish markets law 
a shareholder that acquires 90% of the shares encompassed by the offer and consequently reaches, 
90% of the outstanding shares of a publicly listed company, has the right to buy all the remaining 
outstanding shares and subsequently delist the company. Thus, if MFS rejects EDP’s offer, the 
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latter would likely not be able to acquire the minimum 90% of the shares encompassed by the 
offer and therefore would not be possible to launch a compulsory acquisition2. 
For Mr. Pimentel this would raise a few questions. While selling the fund's shares would result in 
an immediate capital gain, joining the activists to force EDP to raise its offer could result in an 
even higher one. Or, in a failed offer without any prospects of any such other offer in the near 
future. Then, he sat at his office to review all the relevant issues and the alternatives he faced. 
 
EDP – Energias de Portugal 
Energias de Portugal (EDP) is a vertically integrated Portuguese utilities’ company. Founded in 
1976, resulted from the nationalization and merger of Portuguese electricity operators. EDP, 
headquartered in Lisbon, was initially incorporated as a government owned company. Then, in 
1997, the government decided to privatize the company. This privatization process was made in 
5 different phases. On June 17, 1997, during the first privatization phase, the shares representing 
the EDP share capital were admitted to trading in the official stock exchange Euronext Lisbon3 at 
€2.16 per share. Then, after subsequent reprivatisation phases, more EDP’s shares have been 
admitted in the Euronext Lisbon. In December 2011, China Three Gorges (CTG), a Chinese state-
owned power company, won the bidding for 21.35% of the share capital and voting rights of EDP, 
becoming the most relevant shareholder of the electric company.   
The EDP Group's activities are centred on the generation, distribution and commercialization of 
electric power, as well as the information technologies areas. In addition, the group's business 
includes complementary areas, such as water, gas, engineering and laboratory testing, vocational 
training and real estate management. Initially, the company started its operations in Portugal, 
however, given the geographical proximity of Spain, the Iberian Peninsula electricity market 
became a natural market for EDP, even though its wind energy assets are held through EDP 
Renováveis. 
EDP performs all these activities through the Group’s subsidiaries (Exhibit 2). However, since 
2017 EDP has been modifying its business portfolio, mainly through the divestment of its gas 
distribution operators in the Iberian Peninsula. On March 27, 2017, EDP informed it would sell 
Naturgas Energía Distribuición and on April 7, 2017, EDP announced that it would dispose of 
its gas distribution utility EDP Gás.  
EDP was changing its portfolio to focus on production and distribution of electricity and 
consequently, increase its profitability. Thus, the company was selling assets with lower 
profitability levels and was investing in other asset classes with higher profitability, such as, 
renewable energy assets. These two acquisitions would be essential to both reduce EDP’s level 
of debt and fund its offer for EDPR. In addition, since the renewable energy assets are typically 
owned through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), EDP would have easy access for credit for these 
renewable projects without affecting the parent company. 
                                                     
2 Compulsory acquisition: used to force all the minority shareholders to sell their shares without the owners’ 
consent. 
3 Lisbon Stock exchange at that time. 
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In 2016, EDP ranked among Europe’s major electricity companies and was the third largest 
generator in the Iberian Peninsula. The company was present in 14 countries and had more than 
9.8 million electricity consumers worldwide (Exhibit 3). 
The Green Bubble 
By the end of 2005, the renewables energy sector captured investors’ attention as the number of 
renewable energy companies was significantly increasing. Investors were starting to be interested 
in this clean technology and consequently, there was a lot of capital moving towards to this sector. 
Therefore, many Initial Public Offerings (IPO’s) took place at that time and consequently, the 
renewables industry became one of the fastest growing and profitable industries in the world. 
Countries were increasing their incentives to those companies, analysts were supporting the idea 
of excess demand of renewable energy and even books the topic “The Green Bubble” 4 were 
written.  
As it is possible to assess by the performance of Renixx Renewable World Index5, this renewable 
energy index outperformed two of the most relevant indexes in the world – S&P 500 and Euro 
Stoxx 50 - from 2005 to 2010 (Exhibit 4). Therefore, the end of 2007 looked like the perfect time 
for EDP to launch one of its most important subsidiaries in the market. So, in 2008, EDP Group 
opted for an IPO on the Euronext Lisbon Stock Exchange to increase the visibility of a “pure 
player in renewables” and, at the same time, to extract all the value growth and potential of its 
renewables division, allowing for industry improvement and activity. This was the biggest IPO 
in Europe at that time. According to António Mexia, EDP's CEO: 
 “The main objective of the IPO is to support the leadership position of EDP 
Renováveis and its program of growth”6  
Hence, in December 2008, EDP Group was the key shareholder, holding 77.5% of the share 
capital of the company recently headquartered in Madrid. Mexia was naturally proud: 
 “(…) after EDP Renováveis Initial Public Offering in NYSE Euronext’s Lisbon market 
last June, the largest in Western Europe. Undoubtedly, this was the event of the year 
for EDP Renováveis, for the EDP Group as well as a milestone for the financial sector 
in Portugal and Europe.”7 
 
EDP Renováveis 
EDP Renováveis started as a renewables division within EDP and it commenced in 1993, when 
Genesa, a renewable company controlled by EDP Group, installed its first wind farm. Since then, 
the business has constantly been growing essentially through the development of greenfield 
projects and the acquisition of new projects and companies that fit with EDPR growth strategy. 
There were very important acquisitions marked as pillars of EDP Renováveis’ history since they 
enabled more efficient management and structure of its business. Particularly, in 2007, the 
                                                     
4 Wimmer Per, The Green Bubble, 2015. 
5 The Renixx World Index is the first global stock index, which comprises the performance of the 30 largest 
companies worldwide of renewable energy industry (weighted by the market capitalization). 
6 António Mexia, 2008 “EDP to price renewables IPO at 7.4-8.9 Euros/share”. in Reuters Market News 
7 António Mexia in EDPR Annual Report 2008. 
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acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy in the U.S., which empowered EDPR to separate its business 
from EDP Group, was one of the most remarkable M&A transactions the company performed.  
Incorporated in Madrid, Spain, the company specializes in the development, construction and 
operation of solar photovoltaic and wind farms (both off-shore and on-shore projects). This sector 
was usually the beneficiary of incentives provided by governments, different among countries, 
such as subsidies to investment, Power Purchasing Agreements (PPA), feed-in tariffs, 
guaranteeing minimum returns on investment (Europe) or tax benefits (US). These regulatory 
frameworks combined with the characteristics of the renewable resource, typically translate into 
stable and predictable cash-flows and low costs of capital. 
Taking advantage of the outstanding performance of this division alongside with the overall 
industry growth, on June 2, 2008, António Mexia, Chairman of EDPR, decided to carve-out this 
subsidiary through an Initial Public Offering and sell 22.5% of EDP Renováveis via an IPO. 
Therefore, EDPR’s shares would become available for trade on June 4, at €8.00 per share at the 
NYSE Euronext Lisbon8. Therefore, 2008 was a very important year for EDP Renováveis. The 
company became the 4th largest renewables company in the world and the 2nd largest publicly 
listed company in the European renewables sector. Furthermore, in the same year, the company 
installed an additional capacity of 1.413 gross MW (744 MW in Europe and 669 MW in North 
America), accordingly with the target defined upon the IPO9. So, at the end of 2008, EDP 
Renováveis had more than 5.0 GW of installed capacity with high Load Factors of renewable 
energy (Exhibit 5).10 
By 2016, EDPR was a leading renewable energy company with 10.408 MW of installed capacity, 
present in many European countries and the Americas (Exhibit 6).  
As of December 31, 2016, EDPR’s shareholder structure consisted of a total qualified 
shareholding of 80.6%, with EDP and MFS Investment Management detaining 77.5% and 3.1% 
of EDPR share capital and voting rights, respectively. Furthermore, EDPR had many other 
investors spread across 23 countries, representing about 19.4% of its share capital (Exhibit 7).11 
Self-Funding Model 
Initially, EDPR funded its operations with corporate debt raised from EDP. However, the 
company changed its funding model, which has become one of the most important pillars of its 
corporate strategy. Indeed, the success of this strategy was fundamental to accelerate value 
creation and it can be described as a combination of Retained Cash Flow from operating assets 
and Asset Rotation strategy.  
The fundamental source of funds of EDP Renováveis has been the EBITDA generated from its 
current assets, which after paying debt and all required costs, is called Retained Cash Flow. These 
                                                     
8 EDP Renováveis’ trading code: EDPR 
9 EDPR set an objective of reaching 10.5 GW of installed capacity by 2012, three times more than the value 
in 2007. 
10 Load Factor: A ratio between the average energy produced per hour (MWh) and the production capacity 
installed (MW). In other words, a ratio between energy produced and power installed. A ratio of 100% is 
only possible if the power plant operates at full capacity 100% all the time. In renewable energy, due to the 
variability of the renewable resource availability (sun and wind) load factors are much lower than these of 
conventional fossil fuel plants. 
11 Free Float of 19.4% - Shares held by other parties available for trading. 
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Cash Flows were available to pay-out dividends to shareholder or to reinvest in new projects or 
companies. Therefore, strong Retained Cash Flow allowed EDPR to partially fund growth. In 
2016, EDPR announced a dividend pay-out policy ranging from 25% to 35% of its annual net 
profit which allowing that most of the cash flow was available to fund growth. In May 2016, the 
company paid €44 million in dividends, corresponding to the low end of the range announced at 
the beginning of the year. Furthermore, Retained Cash Flow increased 13% to €698 million and 
EDPR was expected to retain approximately €3.9 billion from 2016 to 2020. 
Most utilities have been profiting from the development and construction of energy projects and 
then selling stakes to institutional investors and other financial players. On the one hand, this 
strategy allowed investors to take projects during low-yield environments and on the other hand, 
utility companies got compensated for the high levels of risk taken before the operation phase 
(Exhibit 8). It was common to sell a minority stake (typically 49%) when the wind farm was 
complete. EDPR, as wind farm developer, will still operate the farm but frees up capital that might 
be used for another investment, crystalized the value, limited the pressure on its balance sheet 
from big capital expenditures invested at the beginning and gave the returns to its shareholders. 
For the period 2016 to 2020 EDPR had the target to complete €1.1 billion of Asset Rotation, 
which as of December 2016 has already executed €550 million. 
Value Creation 
EDPR has been creating value through a systematic process of dividing the industry value chain 
in three main distinct phases: development, construction and operation (Exhibit 9). This plan 
represented the fundamental base for the Asset Rotation strategy.  
Value for EDPR was mostly created during the development and construction phase since the 
company's distinct strategic competences were more valuable there, which allowed it to be in a 
particular favourable position to undertake the corresponding risks.  
The development phase is critical, being the riskiest phase and the one in which a large portion 
of value is built. Typically, finding sites that have good conditions in terms of availability of the 
natural resource (sun or wind) that would allow farms to operate at high load factors is a critical 
step requiring good technical capabilities. Then, it is fundamental to guarantee all the necessary 
licenses and permits from the regulatory authorities. It is important to note that these licenses and 
permits are different among countries. Furthermore, it is essential to secure the government 
support through a feed-in-tariff or tax benefits for the duration of the project. These may be 
acquired through direct negotiations or competitive tenders. In the latter case, good skills on the 
construction phase may allow for cheaper investment or equipment with more quality leading to 
the possibility of submitting better terms on the tender and successfully winning the bid. On this 
second phase, where another portion of value is built, besides good procurement capabilities, 
successful companies have superior abilities on executing the construction and installation of the. 
Therefore, when EDPR enters the third phase and starts operating the renewable energy plant, the 
only remaining risks are associated with operational issues, such as equipment break down and, 
to a lesser extent, errors made on the previous phases (lower than predicted availability of the 
resource and equipment problems and malfunctions). 
Finally, it is very important to understand that at the end of life of a project, its value decreases 
since the feed-in-tariff (or tax benefit) is guaranteed for a fixed number of years (typically 15-20 
years). So, it is possible to understand the way renewable companies create maximum value until 
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the Commercial Operation Date and some of these companies typically sell a minority stake 
before the operation phase.  
 
Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) 
As of December 31, 2016, apart from the qualified shareholding of EDP, Massachusetts Financial 
Services and its Investment Management subsidiaries controlled 35.5 million shares of EDPR, 
which representing 18.23% of the floated share base, 4.07% of the total shares outstanding and 
4.04% of the total voting rights.   
MFS Investment Management was the America’s first mutual fund, founded in 1924 in Boston. 
This asset manager notified qualified shareholding of EDPR on September 25, 2013. Thus, from 
2013 to 2016, MFS owned 3.1% of EDPR share capital and voting rights. Summing up MFS’s 
shares with the shares owned by its subsidiaries, the American Investment Management 
controlled more than 4% of EDPR. MFS also owned shares in EDP on behalf of its clients. 
One month after EDP announced the Tender offer for EDPR’s minority stakes, Mrs. Maura 
Shaughnessy and Mr. Claud Davis, the fund’s portfolio managers, wrote an open letter to the 
EDP’s Board of Directors presenting their reasons why the amount offered by EDP was unfair 
and asking other minority shareholders to review their analysis (Exhibit 10). This letter was also 
sent to EDPR’s Board of Directors (Exhibit 11). 
 
The offer 
EDP, the parent company, has been acknowledging the positive impact on its core business model 
of becoming the unique shareholder of EDP Renováveis and therefore having full control over 
this subsidiary. EDP’s CEO mentioned that the focus in the electricity generation though 
renewable energy resources was one of the most important pillars of EDP’s business and growth 
strategy. Furthermore, in the 5 years prior to the announcement, EDP was investing 40% of its 
CAPEX in EDPR and the contribution of the latter in EDP’s EBITDA was increasing, reaching 
31% in 2016. The announced strategic rationale for the deal was to increase cooperation in 
specific markets between EDP and EDPR and would be a key point to reinforce the leadership 
position that EDPR had. 
Additionally, regarding the Equity Story of EDP in the European capital markets, the company 
contended there would be no advantages by having two publicly-traded companies in the same 
holding and it pointed some weaknesses about EDPR’s limited free-floating stock such as its low 
liquidity levels12. Therefore, António Mexia, EDP’s CEO, announced the company’s wishes to 
delist EDP Renováveis from Euronext Lisbon.  
Hence, in late 2016, EDP’s executives and its financial advisors, Millennium Investment Bank 
and Santander Totta, began serious discussions about the acquisition’s price of EDPR’s shares. 
On March 27, 2017 EDP announced that it would offer to purchase all the minority stakes of EDP 
Renováveis at €6.80 per share fully paid in cash. The offer period would be from July 6, 2017 to 
                                                     
12 Liquidity refers to the percentage of total number of shares traded during the last 6 months relative to the 
free-float. 
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August 3, 2017 and the relevant sell orders must be received up to the end of that period. The 
results of the offer would be announced on August 4, 2017. 
Moreover, EDP was considering the delisting of EDPR’s shares from Euronext Lisbon. Therefore, 
if as a result of this Tender offer, EDP comes to hold, more than 90% of the voting rights 
corresponding to the share capital of EDPR, EDP would deliberate the possibility to request 
Euronext Lisbon to delist the shares of the acquired company. In addition, in case EDP comes to 
hold at least 90% of the share capital of EDPR and acquires at least 90% of the shares 
encompassed by the offer, shall be considered: 
i. The exercise of a “squeeze-out right” by EDP, allowing EDP to compulsory acquire the 
shares not sold and consequently, exclude all the minority shareholders from EDPR.  
ii. The exercise of a “sell-out right” by the shareholders of the remaining shares of EDPR 
that are not held by EDP.  
Either if EDP requests to delist EDPR from the stock market or in both exercise rights referred 
above, EDP should secure the payment of the same consideration price for an additional period 
of 3 months to the minority shareholders after August 4, 2017. 
Considering the 676,283,856 shares held by EDP, the offer to acquire 196,024,306 shares not 
owned by EDP, represented approximately 22.47% of the target’s equity value. 
“The consideration offered, payable in cash, is of €6.80 per Share, subject to deduction 
of any gross amounts which may be attributed to each Share, such as dividends, 
advance for account of profits or distribution of reserves, such deduction to be made 
from the moment in which the right to said amount has been detached from the Shares 
and provided such detachment occurs prior to the financial settlement of the Offer.”13 
On April 6, 2017, EDP announced a dividend of €0.05 per share that would be paid to shareholders 
at May 8, 2017. Therefore, the consideration to be effectively be paid in cash, should be €6.75 
per Share. 
The offered consideration of €6.80 and the consideration to be paid represent a premium of 9.7% 
and 8.9%, respectively, relative to the closing price of the shares on the day before the preliminary 
announcement (Exhibit 12). EDP also mentioned that the closing price of the Shares was only 
above the consideration to be paid per share only in 15.5% of the trading sessions since the IPO 
of EDP Renováveis. 
Another action considered by EDP was the possibility of a cross-border merger between EDP and 
EDPR. In case a cross-border merger occurs, this must be approved by the management bodies 
of both companies and consequently, EDP should absorb EDPR. Therefore, the shares of EDPR 
would no longer be admitted to trading in the market. 
Valuation 
MFS’ open letter to the Board of Directors of EDP was a response to the price offered by EDP. 
The €6.75 per share offered by EDP represented a premium of 8.9% over the closing price before 
the announcement date. However, the analysts’ average target price on the day before the 
preliminary announcement was 6.1% higher than the amount offered by EDP (Exhibit 13).  
                                                     
13 Prospectus for General and voluntary tender offer dot the acquisition of shares representative of the share 
capital of EDP Renovávies, S.A. 
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In this specific case, EDP mentioned that EDPR was being traded at low liquidity levels when 
compared with liquidity levels of EDP and the target companies of recent comparable Tender 
offers, on the European renewables sector in the 6 months prior to the date of respective 
announcements (Exhibit 14). Therefore, EDP mentioned this could be an excellent opportunity 
for minority shareholders to have an exceptional liquidity event. However, even though EDPR 
had low liquidity levels, some minority shareholders invested in this company with the purpose 
of taking long term positions. 
In the Prospectus, EDP valued EDPR based on comparable companies’ trading multiples 
EV/EBITDA and compared with the premium paid in Public tender offers over comparable 
European companies. In addition, EDP compared its pre-determined range with EDP Renováveis’ 
equity analysts target prices and justified the non-suitability of other methodologies in the offer 
Context - Implied EV/MW & Book Value per share. 
However, to show its disappointment with the offered price, MFS chose two fundamental metrics: 
Asset Value and Cash Flow. Regarding the first one, MFS considered that Asset Value should be 
determined based both on EV/MW of precedent transactions of EDPR and its peers. Regarding 
Cash Flow, the Fund computed a simple multiple valuation based on EV/EBITDA and considered 
Retained Cash Flow from EDPR to determine its ability to grow profitably. Based on MFS’s 
valuation, the Fund concluded EDP was undervaluing EDPR as the price per share resulted from 
its valuation was 35% higher than the price per share offered by EDP. 
 
The Final decision 
EDP’s Tender offer announcement for EDPR was followed by serious criticism. Some minority 
shareholders of the target company considered the price offered by EDP significantly low and 
that it did not reflect the real situation of EDPR. Thus, this could be a good time for risk takers 
that did not believe the Tender offer would end successfully and therefore they could buy more 
shares and wait for an increase in EDP’s offered price.  
Mr. Nuno Pimentel was about to decide the future of the XYZ Asset Management Fund’s shares. 
After carefully considering both the offer from EDP, opening the letter from MFS and prudently 
analysing all the information collected from EDP Renováveis, Mr. Pimentel performed his own 
valuation. What should Mr. Pimentel do? Is this the right time to sell? Is EDP paying a fair price? 
Is EDP taking advantage of a liquidity discount? 
In addition, he weighted the possible risks of rejecting the offer. The biggest problem would come 
if Mr. Pimentel does not sell the shares, EDP does not reach 90% of the share capital of EDPR 
neither pursue with the compulsory acquisition and does not request CMVM to delist EDPR’s 
shares from the stock market. Under this scenario, EDPR still is admitted for trading, nonetheless, 
its liquidity level decreases even more. 
Under the hypothetical scenario that the offer does not end successfully, what could be the main 
issue for Mr. Pimentel? Cross-Border merger could be a problem? Finally, the most important 
question focuses on how desperate was EDP to regain full control of EDPR?  
Those were the main questions Mr. Pimentel considered. Unexpectedly, a typical day in the 
morning became the beginning of many important days for Mr. Nuno Pimentel. 
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Exhibit 1 – Mr. Nuno Pimentel’s dilemma 
 
 










                                                     
14 At the beginning of 2017, EDP was divesting its gas distribution operations in the Iberian Peninsula. EDP 
was selling both EDP Gás and Naturgás. 
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Exhibit 3 – EDP’s world presence 2016 
 
Source: EDP Annual report 2016 
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Exhibit 5 – EDP Renováveis’ key figures 
Source: EDPR Investor Relations 
 
Exhibit 5.1 – EDP Renováveis’ consolidated Income Statement 
Source: EDPR Investor Relations 
 
 
Operating Data 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Installed Capacity (EBITDA 
MW + Eq. Consolidated) 4.400 5.576 6.676 7.483 7.987 8.565 9.036 9.637 10.408
Europe 2.477 2.938 3.439 3.977 4.266 4.796 4.938 5.141 5.163
North America 1.923 2.624 3.224 3.422 3.637 3.685 4.014 4.412 5.041
Brazil 14 14 84 84 84 84 84 204
Electricity Generated (GWh) 7.807 10.907 14.352 16.800 18.445 19.187 19.763 21.388 24.473
Europe 3.900 4.975 6.632 7.301 8.277 9.187 9.323 10.062 11.230
North America 3.907 5.905 7.689 9.330 9.937 9.769 10.204 11.103 12.576
Brazil 26 31 170 231 230 236 222 666
Load Factor (%) 30% 29% 29% 29% 29% 30% 30% 29% 30%
Europe 26% 26% 27% 25% 26% 28% 27% 26% 26%
North America 34% 32% 32% 33% 33% 32% 33% 32% 33%
Brazil 22% 26% 35% 31% 31% 32% 30% 35%
Average Selling Price (€/MWh) 65,9 58,8 58,4 57,7 63,5 62,6 58,9 64,0 60,5
Europe (€/MWh) 98,0 87,2 84,2 88,0 94,2 89,3 80,3 83,0 81,5
North America ($/MWh) 33,2 34,7 34,3 32,8 47,1 48,4 50,8 51,0 46,4
Brazil (R$/MWh) 0,0 0,0 109,4 119,7 286,4 309,2 346,4 370,4 216,1
Employees 630 721 822 796 861 890 919 1.018 1.083
Europe 324 365 398 393 393 467 434 445 455
North America 276 303 332 260 251 298 316 383 422
Brazil 8 17 16 21 23 26 32 34
Holding 30 45 75 127 196 102 143 158 172
Consolidated Income Statement (€m) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Electricity sales and other 520,2 642,0 840,6 957,2 1.157,8 1.191,3 1.153,1 1.349,6 1.453,2
Income from institutional partnerships 61,2 82,7 107,0 111,6 127,4 125,1 123,6 197,4 197,5
Revenues 581,4 724,7 947,7 1.068,8 1.285,2 1.316,4 1.276,7 1.547,1 1.650,8
Other operating income 28,3 42,6 73,0 84,5 63,1 41,4 45,7 161,6 53,8
Operating costs (171,8) (224,7) (307,9) (352,6) (410,7) (437,2) (419,2) (566,3) (533,6)
Supplies and services (107,0) (148,3) (196,2) (225,1) (261,8) (255,2) (256,6) (292,7) (304,7)
Personnel costs (38,1) (42,6) (54,9) (60,8) (62,7) (66,5) (66,1) (84,3) (93,9)
Other operating costs (26,8) (33,8) (56,9) (66,7) (86,2) (115,6) (96,4) (189,3) (134,9)
EBITDA 437,9 542,6 712,8 800,7 937,6 920,5 903,2 1.142,3 1.171,0
EBITDA/Revenues 75,0% 75,0% 75,0% 75,0% 73,0% 70,0% 71,0% 74,0% 71,0%
Provisions 0,8 0,2 0,2 0,3 - (1,3) (0,0) 0,2 (4,7)
Depreciation and amortisation (207,8) (314,4) (434,4) (468,5) (502,7) (464,7) (499,8) (587,5) (624,5)
Amortisation of deferred income 
(government grants)
0,7 2,4 11,4 15,0 15,2 18,5 19,0 22,8 22,2
EBIT 231,6 230,8 289,9 347,5 450,1 473,0 422,4 577,8 564,0
Financial income/(expense) (74,9) (72,2) (174,2) (233,6) (274,9) (261,7) (249,9) (285,5) (350,1)
Share of profit from associates 4,4 3,9 5,0 4,8 6,8 14,7 21,8 (1,5) (0,2)
Pre-tax profit 161,2 162,5 120,8 118,7 182,1 226,0 194,3 290,8 213,7
Income taxes (49,0) (44,8) (37,8) (28,0) (46,0) (56,9) (16,4) (45,4) (37,6)
Profit of the period 112,2 117,8 83,0 90,6 136,1 169,1 177,9 245,5 176,1
Equity holders of EDPR 104,4 114,4 80,2 88,6 126,3 135,1 126,0 166,6 56,3
Non-controlling interests 7,9 3,4 2,8 2,0 9,8 34,0 51,9 78,9 119,8
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Exhibit 5.2 – EDP Renováveis’ Balance Sheet 











Assets (€m) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Property, plant and equipment, net 7.053 8.635 9.982 10.455 10.537 10.095 11.013 12.612 13.437
Intangible assets and goodwill, net 1.395 1.336 1.367 1.334 1.327 1.301 1.405 1.534 1.596
Financial Investments, net 53 60 64 61 57 346 376 340 348
Deferred tax asset 22 28 39 56 89 109 46 47 76
Inventories 12 11 24 24 16 15 21 23 24
Accounts receivable - trade, net 83 106 144 146 180 202 146 222 266
Accounts receivable - other, net 512 637 757 750 800 655 859 338 338
Financial assets at fair value through 
profit and loss
36 37 36 0 0 0 - - -
Collateral deposits - - - - 49 78 81 73 46
Assets held for sale 1 - - - - - - 110 -
Cash and cash equivalents 230 444 424 220 246 255 369 437 603
Total Assets 9.397 11.294 12.835 13.045 13.302 13.058 14.316 15.736 16.734
Equity (€m) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Share capital + share premium 4.914 4.914 4.914 4.914 4.914 4.914 4.914 4.914 4.914
Reserves and retained earnings 89 192 274 325 384 623 742 891 1.155
Consolidated net profit attrib. to equity 
holders of the parent
104 114 80 89 126 135 126 167 56
Non-controlling interests 83 107 126 127 325 418 549 863 1.448
Total Equity 5.190 5.328 5.394 5.454 5.749 6.089 6.331 6.834 7.573
Liabilities (€m) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Financial Debt 1.462 2.673 3.534 3.826 3.874 3.666 3.902 4.220 3.406
Institutional Partnership 895 920 1.009 1.011 942 836 1.067 1.165 1.520
Provisions 51 67 54 58 64 65 99 121 275
Deferred Tax liability 303 343 372 381 381 367 270 316 365
Deferred revenues from institutional 
partnerships
202 434 635 773 738 672 735 791 819
Other liabilities 1.293 1.529 1.839 1.542 1.555 1.363 1.912 2.288 2.776
Total Liabilities 4.206 5.966 7.442 7.591 7.553 6.969 7.986 8.902 9.161
Total Equity and Liabilities 9.397 11.294 12.835 13.045 13.302 13.058 14.316 15.736 16.734
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Exhibit 6 – EDP Renováveis’ world presence 201615 
Source: EDPR Annual Report 2016 
 
Exhibit 7 – EDP Renováveis’ shareholder structure 
 
Please consider that MFS and its subsidiaries hold 4.07% of the total shares outstanding and 
4.04% of the total voting rights of EDP Renováveis. 
 
                                                     
15 In 2016, EDPR Europe (owned 100% by EDPR Group), EDPR North America (owned 100% by EDPR 
Group), EDPR Brazil (owned 55% by EDPR Group and 45% by Energias do Brasil, which is owned 65% 
by EDP). 
US | 4,811 MW
Canada | 30 MW
Mexico | 200 MW
Brazil | 204 MW
Spain | 2,371 MW
Portugal | 1,251 MW
Poland | 418 MW
Romania | 521 MW
UK | 1,1 GW (max) in pipeline
Belgium | 71 MW
France | 388 MW
Italy | 144 MW





MFS EDP Other Shareholders
# of Shares Share Capital Voting Rights
Total number of shares 872.308.162
EDP 676.283.856 77,53% 77,54%
Target Shares 196.024.306 22,47% 22,46%






Shareholders (EX-EDP) by type
Investment Funds SRI Retail Other Pension
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Exhibit 8 – Cost of Capital through the life cycle16 
Source: Morgan Stanley Research – Global Utilities, 2016 
 
Exhibit 9 – Value Creation Strategy 
Source: EDPR Annual Report 2016 
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Exhibit 10 – MFS Investment Management Open Letter 
21 April 2017 
Dear Sirs, Mesdames 
Massachusetts Financial Services Company and its investment management subsidiaries 
(collectively "MFS") are a global investment manager that makes investments on behalf of its 
clients, MFS is currently invested in EDPR on behalf of its clients and controls 35.5 million shares 
which represent 18.2% of the floated share base, 4.07% of the total shares outstanding and 4.04% 
of the total voting rights (as of 19 April 2017). 
MFS is writing this open letter in response to the preliminary announcement made by EDP - 
Energias de Portugal, S.A, ("EDP") dated 27 March 2017 indicating its intention to launch a 
tender offer for the minority shares in EDPR which it does not own (the "Tender Offer"). In 
particular, MFS does not believe that the Tender Offer price of €6.80 per share indicated in the 
preliminary announcement represents fair value for minority shareholders, We would remind 
EDP that the Initial Public Offering price in June 2008 was €8 per share, We urge EDP to revise 
its Tender Offer price which should be materially higher based on our valuations of EDPR as we 
outline below, We believe the share price of EDPR has yet to recover from uncertainties 
surrounding US renewable policy in the recent presidential election. This short-term reaction does 
not reflect the long-term value and future prospects of EDPR's shares.  
We also note that Mr João Manso Neto, the Chief Executive Officer of EDPR, is a member of the 
board of directors of EDP, in this regard, we would expect Mr. Neto to apply the highest standards 
of corporate governance in addressing any perceived or actual conflict of interest resulting from 
his dual capacity in relation to the Tender Offer and that he will be discharging his duties to EDPR 
faithfully. 
Metrics  
In our view, the fair value for the shares in EDPR should be based on two metrics: asset value 
and cash flow. These are the same two metrics that the management of EDPR has identified and 
consistently presented as relevant measures of the value of their underlying business.  
Asset Value  
MFS considers that asset value is one of two critical metrics to fairly value the shares of EDPR. 
This should be based on enterprise value per megawatt basis (EV / MW). This metric was 
supported by Mr. Neto as Chief Executive Officer of EDPR who stated the following on the 
results conference call held on 24 February 2016:  
"I would say that the best way of evaluating the assets is the price that we are being 
paid by them in megawatts in transactions, And I would say, if I want to value this 
company, I would look at the price that we are able to sell the assets."  
Since 2014, EDPR has sold seven assets at an average €1.5m / megawatt with recent transactions 
achieving €1.7m / MW. Based on EDPR's own market valuation presented to investors in March 
2017 (a copy of the presentation is attached, see page 55), a value of €6.80 per share would imply 
an EV / MW of €1.08m per megawatt, a material discount to the average asset value of €1.5m per 
megawatt and the more recent €1.7m per megawatt. Even applying the conservative metric of 
€1.5m per megawatt would result in the valuation of €11.73 per share, 73% higher than the 
Tender Offer price of €6.80 per share. 
EDP’s Tender for EDP Renováveis                                                                     NSBE 17-18 
16 
 
In addition, we believe a fair price should also reflect the EDPR's considerable future pipeline 
opportunities: US renewable growth particularly in the commercial and industrial segments; two 
500 MW French offshore projects with ENGIE as its partner; potential 1.1GW from the offshore 
wind project in the UK; and further development of EDPR's nascent solar platform. 
The Tender Offer price of €6.80 represents €1.08 per megawatt which is a significant 
undervaluation of EDPR when compared to similar energy transactions where the majority 
shareholder bought out minority shareholders: 
• In 2016, Enel SpA acquired the minority shares in Enel Green Power SpA at the EV/MW of 
€158m per megawatt  
• In 2011, Iberdrola S.A acquired the minority shares in Iberdrola Renovables at the EV/MW 
of €1.32m per megawatt  
• In 2011, EDF Group acquired the minority shares in EDF Energies Nouvelles at the EV/MW 
of €2.28m per megawatt 
Applying the average EV/ MW of these three transactions would result in €1.73m per 
megawatt and a valuation of EDPR at €14.05 per share.  
Cash Flow  
There are two cash flow methodologies to value EDPR: Enterprise Value / EBITDA (EV / 
EBITDA) and Retained Cash Flow of ("RCF"). 
Using EV / EBITDA, we see that on a trailing twelve-month EBITDA basis, Enel SpA acquired 
Enel Green Power SpA at 10.8 times; Iberdrola S,A, acquired Iberdrola Renovables at 11.0 times; 
and EDF Group acquired EDF Energie Nourvelles at 13.2 times, at €6.80 per share, EDP is 
attempting to acquire EDPR at 10 times trailing EBITDA. If EDPR were to apply the average 
trailing twelve month EBITDA multiple of these three minority acquisition transactions 
(11,7 times), EDPR would be worth €9.15 per share or a 35% premium to the €6.80 Tender 
Offer price. 
On EDPR’s fourth quarter conference call in 2016 (the "2016 Q4 Call"), EDPR management 
spent a great deal of time focusing on RCF as their cash flow metric of choice, As depicted on 
page 18 of EPDR's March 2017 investor presentation slides, RCF is the “net cash flow generated 
by operations and available to re-invest, distribute and pay debt principal,” The RCF metric 
"captures assets’ cash generation capabilities and EDPR’s ability to grow profitably,” MFS agrees 
that RCF is a critical valuation metric as it most purely represents how much value is being driven 
by EDPR’s management (as RCF represents EDPR's true cash generation). 
In 2016, RCF was €698m (€0.80 cents/share) and EDPR management expects 10%-15% RCF 
growth in 2017 or €768-802m (€0.88-€0.92 cents/share, see page 33 of the March 2017 
presentation). On page 34 of the March 2017 investor presentation slides, EDPR shows their RCF 
goal of €900m (€1.03/share) for 2020 and thus assumes only a 4.6% growth from the midpoint of 
2017 guidance, It appears to us that this 2020 RCF guidance is quite low given the interest savings 
EDPR management has put into place subsequent to the May 2016 Analyst Day where this initial 
2020 RCF guidance was put forth (early payoff in December 2016 of €364mm debt due 2018/19 
bearing an interest cost of 7.7% which results in €28m interest saving – EDPR management 
mentioned a total interest savings of at least €40m from balance sheet restructuring in 2016 on 
the 2016 Q4 Call). In addition, this 2020 RCF goal only includes an additional 1.8GW in the US 
over this period (2016-2020) although EDPR has the potential to add an additional 1.3GW in the 
US as this amount has been 'Safe Harbor' secured (see page 29 of March 2017 investor 
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presentation slide), Thus, based on the lowered financial costs as well as upside in the US 
renewable opportunity, we believe this 2020 RCF estimate is too low but we will use it in our 
cash flow analysis. 
At €6,80 per share, EDPR would be valued at 7.5 times the midpoint of EDPR’s 2017 RCF 
guidance and 6,6 times EDPR’s 2020 RCF guidance (which we believe is too low). At the 
proposed offer of €6.80 per share, EDPR would be trading at a 13.2% 2017 equity cash flow yield 
based on company guidance and a 15.1% 2020 equity cash flow yield. These are significant 
undervaluations relative to EPDR's renewable and infrastructure peers. In theory, EDPR 
could distribute 100% of this RCF if they stopped growing. That is not the case but this gives an 
indication of EDPR's capacity to generate strong cash flows and how a €6,80 per share price 
materially undervalues those cash flows. 
For these reasons, MFS does not consider the Tender Offer price of €6.80 to represent fair value 
to minority shareholders of EDPR and strongly urge EDP to revise its offer. In the interest of 
transparency, MFS is also a shareholder in EDP. A copy of this letter is being made available to 
the board of EDPR. 
Yours faithfully,  
 
Maura Shaughnessy   Claud Davis  
MFS Portfolio Manager  MFS Portfolio Manager 
 
Exhibit 11 – EDP Renováveis’ Board of Directors 
 
















António Luís Guerra Nunes Mexia  
President of the Board of 
Directors  
Chariman of EDP 4.200 Acceptance
João Manuel Manso Neto   
Vice President and Chief 
Executive Officer
Excutive Director of EDP - -
Nuno Pestana de Almeida Alves  Non-Executive Director     Excutive Director of EDP 5.000 Acceptance
Miguel Dias Amaro    Executive Director     Non-Executive Director     25 Acceptance
Gabriel Alonso Imaz    Executive Director     Non-Executive Director     26.503 Acceptance
João Paulo Nogueira Costeira   Executive Director     Non-Executive Director     3.000 Acceptance
Manuel Menéndez Menéndez    Non-Executive Director     Non-Executive Director     - -
João Lopes Raimundo    Non-Executive Director     Independent 840 Acceptance
João Manuel de Mello Franco  Non-Executive Director     Independent 380 Acceptance
Jorge Henriques dos Santos   Non-Executive Director     Independent 200 Acceptance
Gilles August     Non-Executive Director     Independent - -
Acácio Jaime Liberado Mota Piloto  Non-Executive Director     Independent 300 Acceptance
António do Pranto Nogueira Leite  Non-Executive Director     Independent 100 Acceptance
José António Ferreira Machado   Non-Executive Director     Independent 630 Acceptance
Allan J. Katz    Non-Executive Director     Independent - -
Francisca Guedes de Oliveira   Non-Executive Director     Independent - -
Francisco Seixas da Costa   Non-Executive Director     Independent - -
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Exhibit 12 – EDP’s Takeover Price Premium 
 
Source: Prospectus for EDP Renováveis 
 
 
Exhibit 13 – Analysts target share price for EDPR at 27-03-2017 
 
Source: Prospectus for EDP Renováveis, Bloomberg17 
 
                                                     
17 Considering the €6.75 offered per share. 
Date Price Premium (€6.75) Premium (€6.80)
Consideration to be Paid 27-03-2017 6,75 € 
Offered Consideration 27-03-2017 6,80 € 
Dividend Payment 08-05-2017 0,05 € 
Closing Price before the Announcement Date 24-03-2017 6,20 € 8,9% 9,7%
Volume weighted Average Price Since IPO 5,20 € 29,8% 30,8%
IPO 04-06-2008 8,00 € -15,6% -15,0%
Date Recommendation Price per share Premium over Takeover price
EDP 27-03-2017 - 6,75 €                 -
BBVA 23-03-2017 Outperform 7,25 €                 7,41%
BIG 21-03-2017 Buy 7,40 €                 9,63%
Grupo Santander 20-03-2017 Buy 7,80 €                 15,56%
Exane BNP Paribas 20-03-2017 Neutral 6,40 €                 -5,19%
BPI 16-03-2017 Neutral 8,15 €                 20,74%
Morgan Stanley 14-03-2017 Overweight 8,10 €                 20,00%
Intermoney 08-03-2017 Neutral 6,40 €                 -5,19%
Haitong 07-03-2017 Buy 7,90 €                 17,04%
Kepler Cheuvreux 01-03-2017 Buy 7,70 €                 14,07%
Macquarie 01-03-2017 Neutral 5,90 €                 -12,59%
Natixis 01-03-2017 Neutral 6,90 €                 2,22%
Bryan Garnier & Cie 01-03-2017 Neutral 6,30 €                 -6,67%
Bank of America 01-03-2017 Buy 7,70 €                 14,07%
Caixa BI 28-02-2017 Buy 7,60 €                 12,59%
Banco Sabadell 27-02-2017 Buy 8,20 €                 21,48%
Deutsche Bank 27-02-2017 Buy 7,60 €                 12,59%
Berenberg 07-02-2017 Sell 4,50 €                 -33,33%
HSBC 25-01-2017 Buy 7,50 €                 11,11%
Société Générale 19-01-2017 Hold 6,30 €                 -6,67%
UBS 19-01-2017 Buy 8,00 €                 18,52%
Goldman Sachs 13-01-2017 Neutral 6,00 €                 -11,11%
J.P. Morgan 20-12-2016 Overweight 6,70 €                 -0,74%
Citi 12-12-2016 Neutral 6,50 €                 -3,70%
RBC 03-11-2016 Outperform 8,00 €                 18,52%
Axia Ventures 02-11-2016 Buy 8,30 €                 22,96%
Minimum 4,50 €                 -33,3%
Average 7,16 €                 6,1%
Median 7,50 €                 11,1%
Maximum 8,30 €                 23,0%
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Exhibit 14 – Comparable Offers 
 







































                                                     











08-03-2011 Iberdrola Renovables Iberdrola 3,03 € 2,71 € 11,8% 1,43     131,4%
08-04-2011 EDF Energies Nouvelles EDF 40,00 € 36,64 € 9,2% 1,92     56,5%
18-11-2015 Enel Green Power Enel 2,05 € 2,01 € 2,0% 1,83     114,8%
27-03-2017 EDP Renováveis EDP 6,75 € 6,20 € 8,9% 1,08     35,8%








EDP Renováveis (EDPR) is a worldwide renewables company, whose major shareholder is 
Energias de Portugal (EDP). In order to produce and deliver clean electricity, EDPR business 
covers the development, construction and operation of both solar plants and wind farms (onshore 
and offshore).  
This case presents a realistic situation in which EDP announces a Tender offer to regain full 
control of its most important subsidiary, EDP Renováveis. EDP carved-out EDPR in 2008 
through an IPO and in 2017, the company announced it would buyback all the minority stakes of 
the company with the ultimate goal of delist EDPR from Lisbon’s Stock Exchange. 
However, the deal amount offered by EDP had the inherent risk of being rejected by the most 
relevant minority shareholders, such as Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) representing the 
biggest threat for EDP Tender’s success.  
This case presents a hypothetical situation of a small shareholder representing an Asset 
Management company that is involved in the valuation battle of the two most important 
shareholders of EDPR (EDP and MFS) and must decide if he should sell the fund’s shares.   
This case shows the background and history of both EDP and EDPR since the EDPR’s IPO 
(2008), allowing a student to better understand the notions of market timing strategies, valuation 
under specific market conditions. The ultimate objective of this case study is to lead students to 
perform a decision on whether the protagonist of this case should sell or not the shares during the 
Tender. It is very important to consider all the possible consequences of such decision. Regarding 
the valuation computations inherent to this case study, it lodges a good example of the subjectivity 
of technical valuation due to its dependence on the available and public information. 
This case should be taught over a class with no more than one hour and a half. Due to its 
specifications, it was designed for Applied Corporate Finance and M&A courses.  
Key words 
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1. Comment EDPR’s shareholder structure, financial policy and value creation strategy. 
2. What were the reasons for EDPR’s equity carve-out and IPO? Were the particular conditions 
of the stock market for renewables industry a potential reason for such transaction? 
3. Please discuss the terms of EDP’s offer to take EDPR private. From Mr. Nuno point of view, 
what are the pros and cons of this offer? 
4. Considering your two previous answers, do you believe EDP is taking advantage of market 
conditions to sell and later buyback EDPR? Is it a matter of market timing? 
5. Is EDP really undervaluing EDPR? Is EDP buying at discount taking advantage of a liquidity 
discount? Is it a fair price?  On the sell side what do you agree or not with the valuation 
proposed by MFS?  
6. What options do EDPR Shareholders have? What are the pros and cons of each? What is your 
recommendation for EDPR’s shareholders? 
7. Analyse the composition of the two companies' boards. Can you spot any potential conflicts 
of interest? How could have them be minimised? 
 
Case Analysis 
Comment EDPR’s shareholder structure, financial policy and value creation strategy. 
EDP Renováveis is a renewable energy company, expert in the in the development, construction 
and operation of both wind farms and solar plants. Before the Tender Offer, EDP Group controlled 
77.5% of EDPR share capital and voting rights. Excluding the shares held by EDP, the MFS 
Investment Management and its subsidiaries controlled 4.07% of the total shares outstanding and 
4.04% of the total voting rights, corresponding to 18.23% of the floated share base. 
The company operates in many different countries worldwide and, consequently, each country 
has its specific regulation system, remuneration licences and operation incentives. However, the 
value creation strategy of EDPR is similar among all the countries. 
During the last 5 years, EDPR has been developing self-funding strategies in order to fund growth 
and becoming increasingly independent from EDP. These strategies are designed to get the most 
out of EDPR’s assets through Asset Rotation and Retained Cash Flow. In 2016, EDPR indicated 
a dividend pay-out ratio ranging from 25-35% of its annual net profit. In the same year dividends 
paid amounted €44 million corresponding to 25% of its net profit allowing the company to use 
the remaining 75% to partially fund growth. 
Moreover, it is very important to understand how EDPR is creating value and funding growth 
through its Asset Rotation strategy. A typical project englobes three different phases: 
development, construction and operation. However, the first and second phase represent the 
riskiest steps of the value creation process as the main risk on a renewable energy plant comes 
from its construction, connection to transmission grids and all the estimations required during the 
development phase. As mentioned in the case, finding sites that have good conditions in terms of 
sun or wind that would allow farms to operate at high load factors is a critical step requiring good 
technical capabilities. Furthermore, one of the most difficult steps is to guarantee all the necessary 
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licenses and permits from the regulatory authorities as well as the government support through a 
feed-in-tariff or tax benefits.  
Once a wind farm becomes operational, the risk of the project comes down materially, and its 
operating cash flow stream tends to be quite stable over the life time of the project, as the company 
knows already the remuneration of the project due to the government support mentioned above. 
Therefore, an investor that is willing to invest in a project in the operation phase will certainly 
demand a lower return than what EDPR would accept initially to develop and build the wind farm. 
The asset rotation strategy allows EDPR to crystallize the value of the investment made for 
investors and invest this capital gains in new projects.  
Thus, before a project becomes operational, EDPR typically sells a minority stake of 49% of the 
project or SPV in order to keep control of the project and free up capital for further investments, 
contributing to EDPR’s self-funding growth strategy.  
Even though the development and construction are the riskiest phases, there are also operational 
risks that must be considered by an investor during the operation phase (Exhibit 1). It is very 
important to consider the risk resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, systems and 
technology and external events, such as an unexpected increasing in operational & maintenance 
costs or natural disasters. Is also important to consider that the amount of electricity generated is 
dependent on whether conditions, which vary across seasons and locations. Thus, even though 
EDPR studied each site during the development phase, the uncertainty regarding whether 
conditions should be considered. In addition, despite most plants sell electricity under Power 
Purchasing Agreements (PPA) or tariffs, the small portion that is sold with merchant exposure, is 
hedged by the EDPR’s risk department.  
Regarding EDPR’s future perspectives, even though both value creation process and financial 
policy of EDPR are stable and well defined, there are some concerns regarding the storage issue. 
Undoubtedly, in 2016, this became the main challenge for renewables industry and consequently 
for EDP Renováveis. 
 
What were the reasons for EDPR’s equity carve-out and IPO? Were the particular 
conditions of the stock market for that industry a potential reason for such transaction? 
EDP Renováveis started as a small renewables division of EDP. However, this small division has 
been growing since its inception, mainly through inorganic growth. Many M&A transactions 
allowed EDPR to become a leading renewables company in Europe. It is important to highlight 
the acquisition of Horizon Wind Energy in the U.S, in 2007, which allowed EDPR to separate its 
business from EDP and at the same time, start its operation in the United States. 
Hence, in order to get this leading position and provide better visibility to its investments, EDP’s 
Board of Directors thought that by listing EDPR, it would be easier to increase its financial 
capability and, consequently, its ability to acquire assets. In addition, the IPO proceeds, allowed 
EDP to fund growth opportunities of EDPR, allowing the company to meet its target of 10.5 GW 
of installed capacity by 2012. 
Nevertheless, despite EDPR looked-for increase its independence from the parent company, EDP, 
the latter did not want to lose total control of EDPR neither change its management. Thus, the 
equity cave-out looked like the best option for EDP’s shareholders. Many CEOs consider equity 
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carve-outs as an opportunity to “increase the company’s stock price without sacrificing control of 
a valuable business unit.” 19  
Therefore, in 2007, EDP’s Board of Directors decided to carve-out its main subsidiary through 
an IPO at NYSE Euronext Lisbon. It was the biggest IPO in Europe, nonetheless, EDP’s stock 
price did not increase as expected. 
Regarding the market conditions at the time of the IPO, it was expected that long term trends in 
the beginning of the XXI century could favour innovative green companies like EDPR as 
concerns about energy resources and the environment were growing. The renewables industry 
became one of the fastest growing and profitable industries in world as more investors were 
investing in this sector and therefore, more capital was being allocated into the renewables 
industry. Therefore, as it is possible to observe, the renewables index was outperforming two of 
the most relevant indexes in the world, and thus, 2007 looked like the perfect time for EDPR’s 
Initial Public Offering. 
In addition, EDP’s main competitors had already launched their renewables subsidiaries in the 
market during the Green Bubble. Therefore, the economic and financial situation lived in 2008 
allowed EDP to take advantage of that bubble and to introduce its main subsidiary in the market.  
 
Please discuss the terms of EDP’s offer to take EDPR private. From Mr. Nuno point of view, 
what are the pros and cons of this offer? 
During 2016, EDP started to change its portfolio of companies by selling its gas operators and 
focusing on production and distribution of electricity. Renewables projects have higher returns 
than gas operators and are typically owned by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which allows 
EDP to protect itself from the debt raised for each project. Therefore, these changes in EDP’s 
portfolio allowed the company to sell its assets with lower profitability levels and invest in assets 
that are more profitable, such as, renewable energy assets.  
Furthermore, these asset sales allowed EDP to reduce its debt levels and to finance EDPR 
takeover, as well as to consolidate EDPR after de acquisition. EDP wanted to focus in the 
electricity generation sector through renewable energy as EDP believed that growth opportunities 
in the renewables industry would arise in the future. 
Moreover, in late 2016 and in the beginning of 2017, there was an increased use of electricity in 
transportation and development of infrastructure. So, according with the international agreed 
targets, EDP was expecting an increase in demand for renewable energy and therefore it would 
be necessary to meet demand requirements.  
Hence, on March 27, 2017, EDP announced that it would offer to purchase all the minority stakes 
of EDP Renováveis at €6.80 per share fully paid in cash and the results of the offer would be 
announced on August 4, 2017. The ultimate goal of EDP was to have full control of its subsidiary 
and to delist EDPR from the stock market.  
Therefore, in order to achieve this result, EDP needed to acquire 90% of the share capital of EDPR 
and at least 90% of the voting rights corresponding to the share capital of EDPR. If EDP acquires 
at least 90% of the share capital of EDPR and at least 90% of the shares encompassed by the offer, 
                                                     
19 Annema, André, Fallon, William C., Goedhart, Marc H. 2001. “Do carve-outs make sense?” in Mckinsey 
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the Portuguese company might consider the exercise of a squeeze-out right and launch a 
Compulsory acquisition. This action will force all the minority shareholders that did not sell their 
shares during the Tender Offer to do it now. Also, the exercise of a sell-out right should be 
considered to give an opportunity to all minority shareholders to sell their shares. If EDP acquired 
at least 90% of the voting rights relative to the share capital of EDPR, it would be possible to 
request to CMVM the delisting of the shares of EDPR from the Euronext Lisbon. 
From Mr. Nuno perspective, this offer could be an excellent opportunity to take advantage of an 
exceptional liquidity event and to obtain a premium of 8.9% relative to the share price on the day 
before the announcement date. On the other hand, Mr. Pimentel could be interested in owning the 
stock for the long term as investing in EDPR is an excellent way to invest in a global renewables 
player with a strong management team. In this case, this exceptional liquidity event would not 
represent an advantage for Mr. Pimentel and the amount offered might not be fair from his 
perspective. 
 
Considering your two previous answers, do you believe EDP is taking advantage of market 
conditions to sell and later buyback EDPR? Is it a matter of market timing? 
Considering the market conditions at the time of EDPR equity carve-out, it is possible to 
understand that EDP took advantage of market valuations for renewables companies. As 
mentioned before, a lot of capital was moving towards this sector and investors were overvaluing 
these companies. In other words, in 2008, EDPR was more valuable to the market than it was for 
EDP, and therefore, the parent company took advantage of it. However, when the market is no 
longer overvaluing the renewable company anymore, EDP would buy back by a cheaper price 
than it sold.  
Furthermore, future perspectives for the renewables industry and the consolidation and integration 
of the activities of EDP and EDPR thought a cross-border merger would be benefiting for both 
companies. 
Thus, 9 years later, EDP found this opportunity and announced the offer. Indeed, even though 
market timing strategies are very difficult to predict, this case might be a reference of a 
successfully strategic finance plan. Sell when the company is overvalued and buy when the 
company is undervalued seems to be a market timing strategy which gives EDP the title of an 
expert at buying low after selling high.  
Furthermore, it is fundamental to consider what EDP’s main competitors did with their most 
relevant subsidiaries, previously launched in the stock market during the Green Bubble. Iberdrola 
from Spain, EDF from France and the Italian company, Enel, have all delisted and consolidated 
their renewable energy subsidiaries years before the EDP’s Tender offer, leaving EDPR as the 
only major listed pure-play renewables company in the utilities industry (Exhibit 2).  
This fact, could create valuation problems for investors and for EDPR. After the consolidating 
the subsidiaries of EDP’s main competitors, the public information of the most relevant 
comparables for EDP Renováveis became unavailable, and consequently, it would be much more 
difficult to find adequate peers for EDPR.  
Moreover, at the time of the offer, EDP Renováveis was being traded at a lower liquidity levels 
when compared with the subsidiaries of EDP’s main competitors, years before. It means that, the 
volume of trading of EDPR’s stock was much lower that the volume of trading of its peers, before 
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they merged with their parent companies. Consequently, EDP could also take advantage of such 
low liquidity levels and buy for a cheaper value, reinforcing the idea of timing.  
Thus, even though EDP wanted to simplify its Equity story by concentrating its presence in the 
capital markets solely through EDP’s stock, the parent company has been performing as a 
strategic player in the financial markets. EDP has been considering its internal conditions, 
competitive advantages, and consequently taking advantage of favour market conditions. 
 
Is EDP really undervaluing EDPR? Is EDP buying at discount taking advantage of a 
liquidity discount? Is it a fair price?  On the sell side what do you agree or not with the 
valuation proposed by MFS?   
Tender offers require shareholders to determine how much the company is worth. In this case, 
one should note that asset valuation based on private information is completely different from 
valuations based on public information. Nonetheless, even though all EDPR shareholders have 
access to same private information, EDP has privilege information since the EDPR management 
team is composed by members that are also Executive Directors of EDP. In addition, it is also 
important to note that a company may be valued at a premium or discount depending on all 
relevant measures that are not included in the financial statements of the company, such as its 
market position, competitive advantages and liquidity levels. 
In the renewables industry, it is completely different to value a company based on private or 
public information. If private information is available, it is easy to compute a sum of parts through 
a Discounted Cash Flow of each wind farm, solar plant or SPV. Renewable projects have huge 
initial capital expenditures and then stable cash flows for 15-20 years from the Commencement 
Operation Date (COD). However, if only public information is available, the multiples valuation 
seems to be the only possible method, despite all the assumptions inherent to this methodology. 
Despite MFS’ multiples valuation based on MW, it is important to understand that this method 
does not represent an accurate valuation technique. In this industry, considering the value creation 
process, the transaction prices depend on many other factors than just capacity. Hence, metrics 
such as the age of the assets, operating costs, local wind conditions, operating efficiency, power 
price agreements, local tax rules, subsidies and financing, have a major influence in the 
transaction price20. For instance, the EV/MW multiple includes exclusively assets that are 
operational, generating cash flows and their respective costs, which is not comparable with the 
cost structure of the EDPR group21. 
In addition, the regulatory system and the government support are completely different among 
countries. Therefore, the value per MW of an asset in Portugal is different from the value of the 
same asset in the United States. Also, based on multiples valuation, one is assuming that assets 
will operate in perpetuity, which is completely wrong in this case of renewables projects. Thus, 
when considering the operating life of a farm and the period that a tariff is guaranteed, one should 
                                                     
20 “A market approach for valuing wind farm assets Global results”. 2016 in Deloitte 
21 EDPR group structure costs include “costs with the top management team, business development, human 
resources, central planning service, control and accounting, information technology, R&D” – Prospectus 
for EDPR 
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also note that these factors vary among renewable energy farms and, once more, are dependent 
on the country in which the operating farm is installed. 
Furthermore, wind farms and solar plants have different characteristics, which requires different 
valuations and consequently different multiples. In addition, offshore wind farm assets differ from 
onshore wind farm assets. Thus, assuming a target multiple for EDPR based on comparable 
companies with different proportions of solar and wind projects from EDPR, reinforces the fact 
that this method does not represent an accurate valuation technique. 
In order to figure out if EDP is undervaluing EDPR when computing EV/EBITDA and EV/MW 
multiples some EDPR’s peers were considered. To analyse similar precedent transactions, 
Iberdrola, EDF and Enel were selected as they bought back their renewables subsidiaries and 
their average EV/MW multiple was €1.73m /MW (Exhibit 2). 
Moreover, since 2012, EDPR has been selling its assets at an average €1.5m /MW and the last 4 
transactions presented in the prospectus achieved €1.7m /MW. Comparing both EV/MW from 
similar precedent transactions and EDPR’s recent divestments, it is possible to conclude that EDP 
is valuing EDPR at substantially lower amount per MW as the multiple correspondent to the offer 
is €1.08m /MW (Exhibit 3).  
Moreover, to compute the EV/EBITDA multiple of EDPR’s peers, Acciona, Iberdrola, Enel, 
Dong Energy, Nextera and ERG were select. These peers were selected based on multiples 
valuation performed by both sell and buy sides (EDP and MFS), and information of fiscal year 
2016 was considered (Exhibit 4). It is important to highlight that MFS’s portfolio managers 
mentioned that EDP considered some peers that MFS does not know, even though the American 
fund has been operating in this business for 30 years. Thus, one may note how valuations might 
be manipulated due to subjective assumptions, giving a good example that valuation is not exact 
science. 
As mentioned in the previous question, considering the amount offered by EDP, the offer 
consideration of €6.80 per share and the Consideration to be paid represent a premium of 9.7% 
and 8.9%, respectively, relative to the closing price of the shares on the day before the preliminary 
announcement. Indeed, an easy way to analyse the attractiveness of this offer is by comparing the 
premium EDPR’s shareholders would obtain, with the average 7.7% premium paid in the recent 
comparables transactions. Thus, one may conclude that EDP is paying a higher premium.  
However, based on an analysis performed by Deloitte, the 95% confidence interval for the 
EV/MW multiple of an onshore wind project varies between 1.6x and 1.7x, in millions (Exhibit 
5). For an offshore project, this multiple ranges between 4.1x and 5.0x, in millions. The same 
multiple for solar plants is between 1.4x and 1.7x, in millions, with a 95% degree of certainty 
(Exhibit 6). These values allow minority shareholders to understand that €1.08m /MW given by 
EDP is significantly below the lower bound of the expected ranges.  
This lower amount offered by EDP might be due to EDPR’s shares historical liquidity level of 
35.8% which is the lowest among the peers used. Moreover, this level is clearly below the average 
of 100.9% of the average liquidity levels. Therefore, EDP might be taking advantage of a liquidity 
discount and, giving to shareholders an extraordinary liquidity event. 
Assuming EDPR performs in the median of its comparable companies, a football field was 
computed based on these 4 multiples mentioned above. The EV/MW of precedent similar 
transactions, EV/MW of divestments made by EDPR, 2016 EV/EBITDA multiple of EDPR’s 
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peers and EV/EBITDA correspondent to precedent similar transactions. The share price obtained 
is €10.63 per share, 57% higher than the consideration to be paid (€6.75 per share) (Exhibit 7). 
 
What options do EDPR Shareholders have? What ae the pros and cons of each? What is 
your recommendation for EDPR’s shareholders? 
EDPR’s minority shareholders, representing 22.47% of the share capital will have to decide the 
future of their shares. Thus, sell or not to sell is the main issue for each minority shareholder. 
If they sell, they will have capital gains, obtaining a premium of 8.9% comparing to the share 
price on the day before the announcement date. If they retain their shares in order to obtain a 
higher price, there are three possible scenarios, depending on the number of shares bought by 
EDP in the offer.  
Scenario 1:  
• EDP holds at least 90% of the shares representative of the share capital of EDPR and acquires 
at least 90% of the shares encompassed in the offer 
▪ EDP launches a compulsory acquisition to exclude all the minority shareholders 
(squeeze-out and sell-out right) and the amount paid should be equal to the 
consideration offered in the Tender offer. 
• EDP holds more than 90% of the voting rights corresponding to EDPR’s share capital. 
▪ EDP might consider the possibility to request Euronext Lisbon to delist the shares of 
EDPR from the stock market and the amount paid should be equal to the 
consideration offered in the Tender offer. 
If this scenario occurs, the offer ends successfully and all the minority shareholders will be forced 
to sell their shares obtaining a premium of 8.9% comparing to the share price on the day before 
the announcement date. From Mr. Nuno Pimentel’s perspective, if he did not want to sell the 
fund’s shares, he will be forced to do it. Although he might receive a premium, he will lose a 
long-term position at EDPR. 
Scenario 2: 
• EDP holds less than 90% of the shares representative of the share capital of EDPR or does 
not acquire more than 90% of the shares encompassed by the offer. 
▪ Both the squeeze-out and sell-out rights are not applicable and, consequently, EDP 
is not able to force the remaining shareholders to sell their positions. 
▪ EDP might not launch another takeover for the remaining shareholders and 
consequently they would lose their liquidity (assuming EDP bought shares during the 
offer period). 
• EDP holds more than 90% of the voting rights corresponding to EDPR’s share capital  
▪ EDP might consider the possibility to request Euronext Lisbon to delist of the shares 
of EDPR from the stock market 
This is the worst scenario for all the minority shareholders that did not sell their shares. Under 
this scenario EDP is not able to force the remaining shareholder to sell their positions and the 
parent company might not request the immediately delist of EDPR’s from the stock market. 
Therefore, if Mr. Pimentel did not sell his Fund’s shares, he should be worried as the free-float 
amount will be significantly reduced which would imply further liquidity discount. There are no 
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pros from his perspective as he did not accept the amount offered by EPD and after the offer 
period he probably could sell the fund’s shares by a lower amount. 
Scenario 3: 
• EDP holds less than 90% of the shares representative of the share capital of EDPR. 
• EDP holds less than 90% of the voting rights corresponding to EDPR’s share capital  
• Thus, minority shareholders should wait for further actions from EDP. 
▪ EDP could increase the amount offered per share and there might be more capital 
gains comparing with the previous price of €6.75 per share. 
▪ EDP does nothing and therefore minority shareholder still hold their shares. 
▪ EDP merges with EDPR as all the required permits are allowed. 
In this case, if Mr. Nuno disagreed with the amount offered by EDP in the Tender, this might be 
the best scenario if EDP does nothing or increases the amount offered per share. However, if EDP 
merges with EDPR, the uncertainty regarding the amount to be received will worry Mr. Pimentel.   
After considering these three scenarios it is also very important to consider the Open Letter written 
by MFS’ Portfolio Managers. They mentioned that they will not sell their equity position of EDPR 
and therefore, if their position holds, the offer would not be successful since it would not be 
possible for EDP to buy 90% of the shares encompassed by the offer and consequently, both the 
squeeze-out and sell-out right are not applicable. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Pimentel could receive the same amount as CMVM ruled that in case EDP 
requests the delisting of the shares from the stock market Euronext Lisbon, EDP shall maintain a 
permanent purchase order of EDPR’s shares with the same conditions as the Tender Offer. 
However, this request might not happen immediately and therefore Mr. Pimentel could “lose” all 
his stake of EDPR due to the low liquidity levels presented on this scenario.  
Although the price offered by EDP was low and MFS has the future of both squeeze-out and sell-
out rights in its hands, the best advice for Mr. Nuno Pimentel would be to sell the Fund’s shares. 
As a small shareholder with limited power, Mr. Pimentel has no power to influence the success 
of the offer neither to influence EDP to increase the amount offered per share. Therefore, Mr. 
Pimentel could believe that the risk he is facing if he does not sell is too high when compared to 
the return he might has.  
 
Analyse the composition of the two companies' boards. Can you spot any potential conflicts 
of interest? How could have them be minimised? 
Minority shareholders have many concerns regarding the independent fairness amount offered by 
EDP, considering the inherent conflicts of interest between the Board of Directors of both 
companies. In this case, management of EDPR is undoubtedly aligned with EDP and is willing 
to accept the Tender amount offered by EDP. Therefore, for many minority shareholders this 
alignment would not be a good evidence.  
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Minority shareholders, such as MFS and Ecofin22 asked EDP to revise the Tender’s price, which 
accordingly with news, would not be successful, as Mr. António Mexia stated that EDP would 
not increase the amount offered per share.  
“We also note that Mr João Manso Neto, the Chief Executive Officer of EDPR, is a 
member of the board of directors of EDP, in this regard, we would expect Mr. Neto to 
apply the highest standards of corporate governance in addressing any perceived or 
actual conflict of interest resulting from his dual capacity in relation to the Tender 
Offer and that he will be discharging his duties to EDPR faithfully.”23 
Messrs. António Mexia, Nuno Pestana de Almeida Alves and João Manso Neto are members of 
EDP’s Executive Board of Directors and members of the management board of EDP Renováveis 
simultaneously. Thus, since these members are involved in a conflict of interest, they should not 
attend, participate or vote in any subject related to the offer. This includes, both Board of 
Directors’ meetings and any other decision-making department or committee. Consequently, a 
special Committee should be created in order to discuss all these subjects related to the Offer. 
In this specific case, it is possible to observe that 60% of the independent board members of EDPR 
are in favour of the offer which might be more difficult to EDPR’s minority shareholders to 
encourage the remaining shareholders to hold their shares and ask EDP to increase the amount 
offered per share.  
 
Conclusions 
During the offer period, EDP acquired 5.1% stake of EDPR. Therefore, at the end of the period, 
EDP increased its equity stake of EDPR to 82.6% (Exhibit 8). Thus, considering Question 6, 
EDP and all the minority shareholders of EDPR ended up under the third scenario. EDP is not 
able to launch a compulsory acquisition neither to request CMVM to delist EDPR shares from 






                                                     
22 Ecofin is a leading independent investment management firm which specializes in infrastructure and the 
transition to a more energy efficient economy, globally. 
23 MFS’s open letter to EDP’s Board of Directors 
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Exhibit 1 – Value creation risks 
 
Source: EDPR annual report 2016  
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Exhibit 2 – Comparables precedent buybacks 
 
*EV/MW multiple is in million 
Source: Prospectus for EDP Renováveis 
 
 
Exhibit 3 – EDPR’s precedent divestments (EUR) 
*EV/MW multiples are in million 
Source: Prospectus for EDP Renováveis  
 
Exhibit 4 – EDPR’s comparables (million EUR)24 









                                                     






Price one Day before 
the Preliminary offer
Premium EV/EBITDA EV/MW Liquidity
08-03-2011 Iberdrola Renovables Iberdrola 3,03 € 2,71 € 11,8% 12,58x 1,43x 131,4%
08-04-2011 EDF Energies Nouvelles EDF 40,00 € 36,64 € 9,2% 13,13x 1,92x 56,5%
18-11-2015 Enel Green Power Enel 2,05 € 2,01 € 2,0% 10,47x 1,83x 114,8%
Average 7,7% 12,06x 1,73x 100,9%
6,75 € 8,9% 9,61x 1,08x
6,80 € 9,7% 9,65x 1,09x
27-03-2017 EDP Renováveis EDP 6,20 € 35,8%




Nov 2012 USA Borealis Infrastructure 49,0% 599 1,0x
Jun 2013 Portugal CTG 49,0% 644 1,6x
Sep 2013 USA Fiera Axium Infrastructure 49,0% 97 0,8x
Oct 2013 France Axpo 49,0% 100 1,3x
Aug 2014 USA Fiera Axium Infrastructure 36,0% 1.101 1,1x
Oct 2014 France EFG Hermes 49,0% 270 1,3x
Nov 2014 Canada Northleaf Capital Partners 49,0% 30 2,3x
Dec 2014 Brazil CTG 49,0% 321 1,5x
Nov 2015 USA Fiera Axium Infrastructure 34,0% 1.002 1,6x
Dec 2015 Italy and Poland CTG 49,0% 598 1,7x
Apr 2016 Belgium EFG Hermes 49,0% 664 1,7x





Name Mkt Cap EBITDA Min Int
Oth Non-
Cash Adj
Net Debt Shares Out EV EV/EBITDA
EDP Renováveis 5.265 1.171 1.448 11 2.803 872,308 9.527 8,14x
Acciona 4.004 1.881 266 -584 5.109 57,260 8.795 7,00x
Iberdrola 39.661 7.917 3.446 -443 29.144 417,726 71.808 9,07x
Enel 42.578 15.276 17.772 260 42.990 30,600 103.600 6,78x
Orsted 15.130 2.272 692 134 635 142,804 16.590 7,30x
Nextera 54.284 7.219 939 173 28.016 290,954 83.411 11,56x
ERG 1.533 451 0 -29 1.666 6.230,656 3.171 7,03x
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Exhibit 5 – Value creation for onshore wind farm assets25 
 




                                                     
25 “A market approach for valuing wind farm assets, Global results”. April 2016 in Deloitte 
26 “A market approach for valuing solar PV farm assets, Global results”. April 2016 in Deloitte 
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Exhibit 7 – Football Field (million EUR) 
*EV/MW multiples are in millions 
 
*Median Enterprise value in in millions 
 
 




EDPR Precedent Divestments EV/MW 1,3x 1,7x 13.091 17.693 
Comprables EV/EBITDA 7,0x 8,6x 8.206 10.104 
Comparables Precedent Transactions EV/MW 1,6x 1,9x 16.964 19.514 
Comparables Precedent Transactions EV/EBITDA 11,5x 12,9x 13.495 15.053 
Multiple Range Implied EV
Median EV 13.534 
Multiple EV/EBITDA 11,56x
Median Share Price 10,63 
Preimum relative to €6.75 57%
Output Football Field
EDPR Shareholders' structure Aug 2017 March 2017
MFS 3,1% 3,1%
EDP 82,6% 77,5%









7.000 9.000 11.000 13.000 15.000 17.000 19.000 21.000
EDPR Precedent Divestments EV/MW
Comprables EV/EBITDA
Comparables Precedent Transactions EV/MW
Comparables Precedent Transactions EV/EBITDA
13.534
